Abstract. We determine what information about failures is necessary and sufficient to solve Consensus in asynchronous distributed systems subject to crash failures. In Chandra and Toueg [1996], it is shown that {ᐃ, a failure detector that provides surprisingly little information about which processes have crashed, is sufficient to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems with a majority of correct processes. In this paper, we prove that to solve Consensus, any failure detector has to provide at least as much information as {ᐃ. Thus, {ᐃ is indeed the weakest failure detector for solving Consensus in asynchronous systems with a majority of correct processes.
1. Introduction 1.1. BACKGROUND. The asynchronous model of distributed computing has been extensively studied. Informally, an asynchronous distributed system is one in which message transmission times and relative processor speeds are both unbounded. Thus, an algorithm designed for an asynchronous system does not rely on such bounds for its correctness. In practice, asynchrony is introduced by unpredictable loads on the system. Although the asynchronous model of computation is attractive for the reasons outlined above, it is well known that many fundamental problems of faulttolerant distributed computing that are solvable in synchronous systems, are unsolvable in asynchronous systems. In particular, it is well known that Consensus, and several forms of reliable broadcast, including Atomic Broadcast, cannot be solved deterministically in an asynchronous system that is subject to even a single crash failure [Fischer et al. 1985; Dolev et al. 1987] . Essentially, these impossibility results stem from the inherent difficulty of determining whether a process has actually crashed or is only "very slow".
To circumvent these impossibility results, previous research focused on the use of randomization techniques [Chor and Dwork 1989] , the definition of some weaker problems and their solutions, 1 or the study of several models of partial synchrony Dwork et al. 1988] . Nevertheless, the impossibility of deterministic solutions to many agreement problems (such as Consensus and Atomic Broadcast) remains a major obstacle to the use of the asynchronous model of computation for fault-tolerant distributed computing.
An alternative approach to circumvent such impossibility results is to augment the asynchronous model of computation with a failure detector. Informally, a failure detector is a distributed oracle that gives (possibly incorrect) hints about which processes may have crashed so far: Each process has access to a local failure detector module that monitors other processes in the system, and maintains a list of those that it currently suspects to have crashed. Each process periodically consults its failure detector module, and uses the list of suspects returned in solving Consensus.
A failure detector module can make mistakes by erroneously adding processes to its list of suspects: that is, it can suspect that a process p has crashed even though p is still running. If it later believes that suspecting p was a mistake, it can remove p from its list. Thus, each module may repeatedly add and remove processes from its list of suspects. Furthermore, at any given time the failure detector modules at two different processes may have different lists of suspects.
It is important to note that the mistakes made by a failure detector should not prevent any correct process from behaving according to specification. For example, consider an algorithm that uses a failure detector to solve Atomic Broadcast in an asynchronous system. Suppose all the failure detector modules wrongly (and permanently) suspect that a correct process p has crashed. The Atomic Broadcast algorithm must still ensure that p delivers the same set of messages, in the same order, as all the other correct processes. Furthermore, if p broadcasts a message m, all correct processes must deliver m.
2
In Chandra and Toueg [1996] , it is shown that a surprisingly weak failure detector is sufficient to solve Consensus and Atomic Broadcast in asynchronous systems with a majority of correct processes. This failure detector, called the eventually weak failure detector and denoted ᐃ here, satisfies only the following two properties: 3 (1) There is a time after which every process that crashes is always suspected by some correct process. (2) There is a time after which some correct process is never suspected by any correct process.
Note that, at any given time t, processes cannot use ᐃ to determine the identity of a correct process. Furthermore, they cannot determine whether there is a correct process that will not be suspected after time t.
The failure detector ᐃ can make an infinite number of mistakes. In fact, it can forever add and then remove some correct processes from its lists of suspects (this reflects the inherent difficulty of determining whether a process is just slow or has crashed). Moreover, some correct processes may be erroneously suspected to have crashed by all the other processes throughout the entire execution.
The two properties of ᐃ state that eventually something must hold forever; this may appear too strong a requirement to implement in practice. However, when solving a problem that "terminates," such as Consensus, it is not really required that the properties hold forever, but merely that they hold for a sufficiently long time, that is, long enough for the algorithm that uses the failure detector to achieve its goal. For instance, in practice the algorithm of Chandra and Toueg [1996] that solves Consensus using ᐃ only needs the two properties of ᐃ to hold for a relatively short period of time. 4 However, in an asynchronous system it is not possible to quantify "sufficiently long", since even a single process step or a single message transmission is allowed to take an arbitrarily long amount of time. Thus, it is convenient to state the properties of ᐃ in the stronger form given above.
1.2. THE PROBLEM. The failure detection properties of ᐃ are sufficient to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems. But are they necessary? For example, consider failure detector Ꮽ that satisfies Property (1) of ᐃ and the following weakening of Property (2): There is a time after which some correct process is never suspected by at least 99% of the correct processes.
Ꮽ is clearly weaker than ᐃ. Is it possible to solve Consensus using Ꮽ? Indeed what is the weakest failure detector sufficient to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems? In trying to answer this fundamental question, we run into a problem. Consider failure detector Ꮾ that satisfies the following two properties:
(1) There is a time after which every process that crashes is always suspected by all correct processes. (2) There is a time after which some correct process is never suspected by a majority of the processes.
It seems that Ꮾ and ᐃ are incomparable: Ꮾ's first property is stronger than ᐃ's, and Ꮾ's second property is weaker than ᐃ's. Is it possible to solve Consensus in an asynchronous system using Ꮾ? The answer turns out to be "yes" (provided that this asynchronous system has a majority of correct processes, as ᐃ also requires). Since ᐃ and Ꮾ appear to be incomparable, one may be tempted to conclude that ᐃ cannot be the "weakest" failure detector with which Consensus is solvable. Even worse, it raises the possibility that no such "weakest" failure detector exists.
However, a closer examination reveals that Ꮾ and ᐃ are indeed comparable in a natural way: There is a distributed algorithm T Ꮾ3ᐃ that can transform Ꮾ into a failure detector with the Properties (1) and (2) of ᐃ. T Ꮾ3ᐃ works for any asynchronous system that has a majority of correct processes. We say that ᐃ is reducible to Ꮾ in such a system. Since T Ꮾ3ᐃ is able to transform Ꮾ into ᐃ in an asynchronous system, Ꮾ must provide at least as much information about process failures as ᐃ does. Intuitively, Ꮾ is at least as strong as ᐃ. Chandra and Toueg [1996] , it is shown that ᐃ is sufficient to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems if and only if n Ͼ 2f (where n is the total number of processes, and f is the maximum number of processes that may crash). In this paper, we prove that ᐃ is reducible to any failure detector Ᏸ that can be used to solve Consensus (this result holds for any asynchronous system). We show this reduction by giving a distributed algorithm T Ᏸ3ᐃ that transforms any such Ᏸ into ᐃ. Therefore, ᐃ is indeed the weakest failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems with n Ͼ 2f. Furthermore, if n Յ 2f, any failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus must be strictly stronger than ᐃ.
THE RESULT. In
The task of transforming any given failure detector Ᏸ (that can be used to solve Consensus) into ᐃ runs into a serious technical difficulty for the following reasons:
(1) To strengthen our result, we do not restrict the output of Ᏸ to lists of suspects. Instead, this output can be any value that encodes some information about failures. For example, a failure detector Ᏸ should be allowed to output any boolean formula, such as "(not p) and (q or r)" (i.e., p is up and either q or r has crashed)-or any encoding of such a formula. Indeed, the output of Ᏸ could be an arbitrarily complex (and unknown) encoding of failure information. Our transformation from Ᏸ into ᐃ must be able to decode this information. (2) Even if the failure information provided by Ᏸ is not encoded, it is not clear how to extract from it the failure detection properties of ᐃ. Consequently, if Ᏸ is given in isolation, the task of transforming it into ᐃ may not be possible.
Fortunately, since Ᏸ can be used to solve Consensus, there is a corresponding algorithm, Consensus Ᏸ , that is somehow able to "decode" the information about failures provided by Ᏸ, and knows how to use it to solve Consensus. Our reduction algorithm, T Ᏸ3ᐃ uses Consensus Ᏸ to extract this information from Ᏸ and obtain ᐃ.
The Model
We consider asynchronous distributed systems in which there is no bound on message delay, clock drift, or the time necessary to execute a step. Our model of asynchronous computation with failure detection is patterned after the one in Fischer et al. [1985] . The system consists of a set of n processes, ⌸ ϭ { p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n }. Every pair of processes is connected by a reliable communication channel.
To simplify the presentation of our model, we assume the existence of a discrete global clock. This is merely a fictional device: the processes do not have access to it. We take the range -of the clock's ticks to be the set of natural numbers.
2.1. FAILURES AND FAILURE PATTERNS. Processes can fail by crashing, that is, by prematurely halting. A failure pattern F is a function from -to 2 ⌸ , where F(t) denotes the set of processes that have crashed through time t. Once a process crashes, it does not "recover", that is,
we say p crashes in F and if p ʦ correct(F) we say p is correct in F. We consider only failure patterns F such that at least one process is correct, that is, correct (F) .
FAILURE DETECTORS.
Informally, a failure detector provides (possibly incorrect) information about the failure pattern that occurs in an execution. Associated with each failure detector is a (possibly infinite) range of values output by that failure detector. A failure detector history H with range is a function from ⌸ ϫ -to . H( p, t) is the value of the failure detector module of process p at time t. A failure detector Ᏸ is a function that maps each failure pattern F to a set of failure detector histories with range Ᏸ (where Ᏸ denotes the range of failure detector outputs of Ᏸ). Ᏸ(F) denotes the set of possible failure detector histories permitted by Ᏸ for the failure pattern F.
For example, consider the failure detector ᐃ mentioned in the introduction. Each failure detector module of ᐃ outputs a set of processes that are suspected to have crashed: in this case, ᐃ ϭ 2 ⌸ . For each failure pattern F, ᐃ(F) is the set of all failure detector histories H ᐃ with range ᐃ that satisfy the following properties:
(1) There is a time after which every process that crashes in F is always suspected by some process that is correct in F:
(2) There is a time after which some process that is correct in F is never suspected by any process that is correct in F:
Note that we specify a failure detector Ᏸ as a function of the failure pattern F of an execution. However, this does not preclude an implementation of Ᏸ from using other aspects of the execution such as when messages are received. Thus, executions with the same failure pattern F may still have different failure detector histories. It is for this reason that we allow Ᏸ(F) to be a set of failure detector histories from which the actual failure detector history for a particular execution is selected nondeterministically.
2.3. ALGORITHMS. We model the asynchronous communication channels as a message buffer that contains messages of the form ( p, data, q) indicating that process p has sent data addressed to process q and q has not yet received that message. An algorithm A is a collection of n (possibly infinite state) deterministic automata, one for each of the processes. A( p) denotes the automaton running on process p. Computation proceeds in steps of the given algorithm A. In each step of A, process p performs atomically the following three phases:
5
Receive Phase. p receives a single message of the form (q, data, p) from the message buffer, or a "null" message, denoted , meaning that no message is received by p during this step.
Failure Detector Query Phase. p queries and receives a value from its failure detector module. We say that p sees a value d when the value returned by p's failure detector module is d.
Send Phase. p changes its state and sends a message to all the processes according to the automaton A( p), based on its state at the beginning of the step, the message received in the receive phase, and the value that p sees in the failure detector query phase.
The message actually received by process p in the receive phase is chosen nondeterministically from amongst the messages in the message buffer addressed to p, and the null message . The null message may be received even if there are messages in the message buffer that are addressed to p: the fact that m is in the message buffer merely indicates that m was sent to p. Since ours will be a model of asynchronous systems, where messages may experience arbitrary (but finite) delays, the amount of time m may remain in the message buffer before it is received is unbounded. Indeed, our model will allow a message sent later than another to be received earlier than the other. Though message delays are arbitrary, we also want them to be finite. We model this by introducing a liveness assumption: every message sent will eventually be received, provided its recipient makes "sufficiently many" attempts to receive messages. All this will be made more precise later.
We also remark that the nondeterminism arising from the choice of the message to be received reflects the asynchrony of the message buffer-it is not due to nondeterministic choices made by the process. The automaton A( p) is deterministic in the sense that the message that p sends in a step and p's new state are uniquely determined from the present state of p, the message p received during the step and the failure detector value seen by p during the step.
To keep things simple we assume that a process p sends a message m to q at most once. This allows us to speak of the contents of the message buffer as a set, rather than a multiset. We can easily enforce this by adding a counter to each message sent by p to q-so this assumption does not damage generality.
CONFIGURATIONS, RUNS AND ENVIRONMENTS.
A configuration is a pair (s, M), where s is a function mapping each process p to its local state, and M is a set of triples of the form (q, data, p) representing the messages presently in the message buffer. An initial configuration of an algorithm A is a configuration (s, M), where s( p) is an initial state of A( p) and M ϭ . A step of a given algorithm A transforms one configuration to another. A step of A is uniquely determined by the identity of the process p that takes the step, the message m received by p during that step, and the failure detector value d seen by p during the step. Thus, we identify a step of A with a tuple ( p, m, d, A) . If the message received in that step is the null message, then m ϭ , otherwise m is of the form (Ϫ, Ϫ, p). 6 We say that a step e ϭ ( p, m, d, A) is applicable to a configuration C ϭ (s, M) if and only if m ʦ M ഫ {}. We write e(C) to denote the unique configuration that results when e is applied to C.
A schedule S of algorithm A is a finite or infinite sequence of steps of A. S Ќ denotes the empty schedule. We say that a schedule S of an algorithm A is applicable to a configuration C if and only if (a)
the ith element of a sequence v). If S is a finite schedule applicable to C, S(C) denotes the unique configuration that results from applying S to C. Note S Ќ (C) ϭ C for all configurations C. Let C be any configuration and S be any schedule applicable to C. We say that CЈ is a configuration of the pair (S, C) if there is a finite prefix SЈ of S such that CЈ ϭ SЈ(C).
A partial run of algorithm A using a failure detector Ᏸ is a tuple R ϭ ͗F, H Ᏸ , I, S, T͘ where F is a failure pattern, H Ᏸ ʦ Ᏸ(F) is a failure detector history, I is an initial configuration of A, S is a finite schedule of A, and T is a finite list of increasing time values (indicating when each step in S occurred) such that ͉S͉ ϭ ͉T͉, S is applicable to I, and for
(1) p has not crashed by time
Informally, a partial run of A using Ᏸ represents a point of an execution of A using Ᏸ. A run of an algorithm A using a failure detector Ᏸ is a tuple R ϭ ͗F, H Ᏸ , I, S, T͘ where F is a failure pattern, H Ᏸ ʦ Ᏸ(F) is a failure detector history, I is an initial configuration of A, S is an infinite schedule of A, and T is an infinite list of increasing time values indicating when each step in S occurred. In addition to satisfying the above properties of a partial run, a run must also satisfy the following properties:
(1) Every correct process takes an infinite number of steps in S. Formally:
(2) Every message sent to a correct process is eventually received. Formally:
In Chandra and Toueg [1996] , it is shown that any algorithm that uses ᐃ to solve Consensus requires n Ͼ 2f. With other failure detectors the requirements may be different. For example, there is a failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus only if p 1 and p 2 do not both crash. In general, whether a given failure detector can be used to solve Consensus depends upon assumptions about the underlying "environment". Formally, an environment Ᏹ (of an asynchronous system) is set of possible failure patterns. 
The Consensus Problem
In the Consensus problem, each process p has an initial value, 0 or 1, and must reach an irrevocable decision on one of these values. Thus, the algorithm of process p, A( p) 
Irrevocability. Once a correct process decides a value, it remains decided on that value. Formally, let S[1 . . . i] be the prefix of S consisting of the first i elements of S:
Agreement. No two correct processes decide differently. Formally:
Validity. If a correct process decides v, then v was proposed by some process. Formally, let I ϭ (s 0 , M 0 ):
Reducibility
We now define what it means for an algorithm T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ to transform a failure detector Ᏸ into another failure detector ᏰЈ in an environment Ᏹ. 
Given the reduction algorithm T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ , anything that can be done using failure detector ᏰЈ in environment Ᏹ, can be done using Ᏸ instead. To see this, suppose a given algorithm B requires failure detector ᏰЈ (when it executes in Ᏹ), but only Ᏸ is available. We can still execute B as follows. Concurrently with B, processes run T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ to transform Ᏸ into ᏰЈ. We modify Algorithm B at process p as follows: whenever p is required to query its failure detector module, p reads the current value of output p (which is concurrently maintained by T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ ) instead. This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Intuitively, since T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ is able to use Ᏸ to emulate ᏰЈ, Ᏸ provides at least as much information about process failures in Ᏹ as ᏰЈ does. Thus, if there is an algorithm T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ that transforms Ᏸ into ᏰЈ in Ᏹ, we write Ᏸ ՝ ϪᏱ ᏰЈ and say that ᏰЈ is reducible to Ᏸ in Ᏹ; we also say that ᏰЈ is weaker than Ᏸ in Ᏹ. Clearly, the reducibility relation ՝ ϪᏱ is transitive.
Note that, in general, T Ᏸ3ᏰЈ need not emulate all the failure detector histories of ᏰЈ (in environment Ᏹ); what we do require is that all the failure detector histories it emulates be histories of ᏰЈ (in that environment).
An Outline of the Result
In Chandra and Toueg [1996] , it is shown that ᐃ can be used to solve Consensus in any environment in which n Ͼ 2f. We now show that ᐃ is weaker than any failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus. This result holds for any environment Ᏹ. Together with Chandra and Toueg [1996] , this implies that ᐃ is indeed the weakest failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus in any environment in which n Ͼ 2f.
To prove our result, we first define a new failure detector, denoted ⍀, that is at least as strong as ᐃ. We then show that any failure detector Ᏸ that can be used to solve Consensus is at least as strong as ⍀. Thus, Ᏸ is at least as strong as ᐃ.
The output of the failure detector module of ⍀ at a process p is a single process, q, that p currently considers to be correct; we say that p trusts q. In this case, ⍀ ϭ ⌸. For each failure pattern F, ⍀(F) is the set of all failure detector histories H ⍀ with range ⍀ that satisfy the following property:
There is a time after which all the correct processes always trust the same correct process:
As with ᐃ, the output of the failure detector module of ⍀ at a process p may change with time, that is, p may trust different processes at different times. Furthermore, at any given time t, processes p and q may trust different processes.
PROOF [SKETCH] . The reduction algorithm T ⍀3ᐃ that transforms ⍀ into ᐃ is as follows. Each process p periodically sets output p 4 ⌸ Ϫ {q}, where q is the process that p currently trusts according to ⍀. It is easy to see that (in any environment Ᏹ) this output satisfies the two properties of ᐃ. e THEOREM 5.2. For all environments Ᏹ, if a failure detector Ᏸ can be used to solve Consensus in Ᏹ, then Ᏸ ՝ ϪᏱ ⍀.
PROOF. The reduction algorithm T Ᏸ3⍀ is shown in Section 6. It is the core of our result. e COROLLARY 5.3. For all environments Ᏹ, if a failure detector Ᏸ can be used to solve Consensus in Ᏹ, then Ᏸ ՝ ϪᏱ ᐃ.
PROOF. If Ᏸ can be used to solve Consensus in Ᏹ, then, by Theorem 5.2,
In Chandra and Toueg [1996] , it is shown that, for all environments Ᏹ in which n Ͼ 2f, ᐃ can be used to solve Consensus. Together with Corollary 5.3, this shows that: THEOREM 5.4. For all environments Ᏹ in which n Ͼ 2f, ᐃ is the weakest failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus in Ᏹ.
The Reduction Algorithm
6.1. OVERVIEW. Let Ᏹ be an environment, Ᏸ be a failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus in Ᏹ, and Consensus Ᏸ be the Consensus algorithm that uses Ᏸ. We describe an algorithm T Ᏸ3⍀ that transforms Ᏸ into ⍀ in Ᏹ. Intuitively, this algorithm works as follows.
Fix an arbitrary run of T Ᏸ3⍀ using Ᏸ, with failure pattern F ʦ Ᏹ and failure detector history H Ᏸ ʦ Ᏸ(F). Processes periodically query their failure detector Ᏸ and exchange information about the values of H Ᏸ that they see in this run. Using this information, processes construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that represents a "sampling" of failure detector values in H Ᏸ and some temporal relationships between the values sampled.
To illustrate this, suppose that process q 1 queries its failure detector Ᏸ for the k 1 th time and sees value d 1 ; q 1 then sends to all processes the message 
, to its DAG: This edge indicates that q 1 saw d 1 (in its k 1 th query) before q 2 saw d 2 (in its k 2 th query). By periodically sending its current version of the DAG to all processes, and incorporating all the DAGs that it receives into its own DAG, every correct process can construct ever increasing finite approximations of the same (infinite) limit DAG G.
It turns out that DAG G can be used to simulate runs of Consensus Ᏸ with failure pattern F and failure detector history H Ᏸ . These are runs that could have occurred if processes were running Consensus Ᏸ instead of T Ᏸ3⍀ .
To illustrate this, consider a path of G,
. . . We can use this path to simulate schedules of runs of Consensus Ᏸ in which q 1 takes the first step and sees failure detector value d 1 , q 2 takes the second step and sees d 2 , q 3 takes the third step and sees d 3 , etc. We say that such a schedule is "compatible" with path g. Note that there are many schedules of Consensus Ᏸ that are compatible with g: For each step, we have a choice of which message to receive-either one of the messages contained in the simulated buffer (i.e., a message previously sent but not yet received) or the empty message. Now consider any initial configuration I of Consensus Ᏸ . The set of simulated schedules of Consensus Ᏸ that are compatible with some path of G and are also applicable to I can be organized as a tree: paths in this tree represent simulated runs of Consensus Ᏸ with initial configuration I, and branching occurs at the points where simulated runs diverge. By considering several initial configurations of Consensus Ᏸ , we obtain a forest of simulated runs of Consensus Ᏸ : a tree for each different initial configuration.
Thus, the (infinite) DAG G induces an (infinite) simulation forest ⌼ of runs of Consensus Ᏸ with failure pattern F and failure detector history H Ᏸ . Using ⌼, we show that it is possible to extract the identity of a process p* that is correct in F, and we give the extraction algorithm.
The simulation forest ⌼, however, is infinite and cannot be computed by any process. Fortunately, the information needed by the extraction algorithm to identify p* is present in a "crucial" finite subgraph of ⌼ that processes are able to eventually compute. When running T Ᏸ3⍀ , each process p constructs ever increasing finite approximations of the DAG G. Using these approximations, p also constructs ever increasing finite approximations of ⌼ that eventually include the crucial subgraph needed to extract p*. At all times, p runs the extraction algorithm on its present finite approximation of ⌼ to select some process that it considers to be correct: once p's approximation of ⌼ includes the crucial subgraph, the extraction algorithm will select p* (forever). Thus, there is a time after which all correct processes trust the same correct process, p*-which is exactly what ⍀ requires.
Having given an overall account of how the transformation of Ᏸ to ⍀ works, we now provide a roadmap for the rest of this section. We first define the DAGs G that allow us to induce an infinite simulation forest ⌼ (Section 6.2), and to extract a correct process from ⌼ (Sections 6.3-6.5). We then show how processes compute ever increasing approximations of such a G and the corresponding ⌼ (Section 6.6.1). Finally, we show that by periodically extracting a process from their current finite approximation of ⌼, all correct processes will eventually keep extracting (forever) the same correct process (Section 6.6.2).
We now state some conventions that simplify the discussion that follows. We say that a process is correct (crashes) if it is correct (crashes) in F. For the rest of this paper, whenever we refer to a run of Consensus Ᏸ , we mean a run of Consensus Ᏸ using Ᏸ. Furthermore, we only consider schedules of Consensus Ᏸ , and so we write ( p, m, d ) instead of ( p, m, d, Consensus Ᏸ ) to denote a step.
6.2. A DAG AND A FOREST. Let Ᏸ be a failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus in environment Ᏹ. Given an arbitrary failure pattern F ʦ Ᏹ, and failure detector history H Ᏸ ʦ Ᏸ(F), let G be any infinite DAG with the following properties:
(1) The vertices of G are of the form [ p, d, k] 
Each vertex is labeled with a time (an element in -) such that: is an edge of G, then t 1 Ͻ t 2 .
(
(4) Let V be any finite subset of vertices of G and p be any correct process.
There is a d ʦ Ᏸ and a k ʦ N such that for every vertex
Note that G contains only a "sampling" of the failure detector values that occur in H Ᏸ , and only a subset of the temporal relationships that relate them. In other words, we do not require that G contain all the values that occur in H Ᏸ , or that it relate (with an edge) all its values according to the time at which they occur in H Ᏸ . However, Property (4) implies that G contains infinitely many "samplings" of the failure detector module of each correct process.
Let
. . be any (finite or infinite) path of G. A schedule S is compatible with g if it has the same length as g, and S ϭ (q 1 , m 1 , d 1 ), (q 2 , m 2 , d 2 ), . . . , for some (possibly null) messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . . We say that S is compatible with G if it is compatible with some path of G.
Let I be any initial configuration of Consensus Ᏸ . Consider a schedule S that is compatible with G and applicable to I. Intuitively, S is the schedule of a possible run of Consensus Ᏸ with initial configuration I, failure pattern F, and failure detector history H Ᏸ .
We can represent all the schedules that are compatible with G and applicable to I as a tree. This is called the simulation tree ⌼ G I induced by G and I and is defined as follows. The set of vertices of ⌼ G I is the set of finite schedules S that are compatible with G and are applicable to I. The root of ⌼ G I is the empty schedule S Ќ . There is an edge from vertex S to vertex SЈ if and only if SЈ ϭ S ⅐ e for a step e; 8 this edge is labeled e. With each (finite or infinite) path in ⌼ G I , we associate the unique schedule S ϭ e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e k , . . . consisting of the sequence of labels of the edges on that path. Note that if a path starts from the root of ⌼ G I and it is finite, the schedule S associated with it is also the last vertex of that path.
The following two lemmata make precise the connection between paths of ⌼ G I and runs of Consensus Ᏸ . The proofs, which follow directly from the definitions, are included in the Appendix. 
is a vertex of ⌼ G I and all correct processes have decided in S ⅐ E(I).
( PROOF. We first show that the root of ⌼ 0 is 0-valent. Suppose, for contradiction, that the root of ⌼ 0 has tag 1. There must be a vertex S of ⌼ 0 such that some correct process has decided 1 in S(I 0 ). From Lemma 6.2.1, there is a T such that R ϭ ͗F, H Ᏸ , I 0 , S, T͘ is a partial run of Consensus Ᏸ . R violates the validity requirement of Consensus-a contradiction. Thus the root of ⌼ 0 cannot have a tag of 1. From Lemma 6.3.1, the root of ⌼ 0 has at least one tag: thus it is 0-valent.
By a symmetric argument, the root of ⌼ n is 1-valent. e
Index i is critical if the root of ⌼ i is bivalent, or if the root of ⌼ iϪ1 is 0-valent while the root of ⌼ i is 1-valent. In the first case, we say that index i is bivalent critical; in the second case, we say that i is monovalent critical.
PROOF. Apply Lemmata 6.3.2 and 6.3.6 to the roots of
The critical index i is the key to extracting the identity of a correct process. In fact, if i is monovalent critical, we shall prove that p i must be correct (Lemma 6.5.1). If i is bivalent critical, the correct process will be found by focusing on the tree ⌼ i , as explained in the following section.
6.4. OF HOOKS AND FORKS. We describe two forms of finite subtrees of ⌼ i referred to as decision gadgets of ⌼ i . Each type of decision gadget is rooted at the root S Ќ of ⌼ i and has exactly two leaves: one 0-valent and one 1-valent. The least common ancestor of these leaves is called the pivot. The pivot is clearly bivalent.
The first type of decision gadget, called a fork, is shown in Figure 2 . The two leaves are children of the pivot, obtained by applying different steps of the same process p. Process p is called the deciding process of the fork, because its step after the pivot determines the decision of correct processes.
The second type of decision gadget, called a hook, is shown in Figure 3 . Let S be the pivot of the hook. There is a step e such that S ⅐ e is one leaf, and the other leaf is S ⅐ ( p, m, d ) ⅐ e for some p, m, d. Process p is called the deciding process of the hook, because the decision of correct processes is determined by whether p takes the step ( p, m, d ) before e. (The tags of the leaves S ⅐ e and SЈ ⅐ e may be reversed in a hook relative to the tags shown in Figure 3 : it may be that 1 is the only tag of S ⅐ e and 0 is the only tag of SЈ ⅐ e.) 9 We shall prove that the deciding process p of a decision gadget, whether a fork or a hook, must be correct (Lemma 6.5.3). Intuitively, this is because if p crashes, then no process can figure out whether p has taken the step that determines the decision value; indeed, this is so even though processes can consult the failure 9 A fork may be a subgraph of a hook. PROOF. Starting from the bivalent root of ⌼ i , we generate a path in ⌼ i , all the vertices of which are bivalent, as follows: We consider all correct processes in round-robin fashion. Suppose we have generated path S so far, and it is the turn of process p. Let m be the oldest message addressed to p that is in the message buffer of S(I i ). 10 (If no such message exists, we take m to be the null message.) We try to extend the path S so that the last edge in the extension corresponds to p receiving m and the target of that edge is a bivalent vertex. The path construction ends if and when such an extension is no longer possible. This construction is shown in Figure 4 . Each iteration of the loop extends the path by at least one edge. Let be the path generated by these iterations; is finite or infinite depending on whether the loop terminates. CLAIM 6.4.2. is finite.
PROOF. Suppose, for contradiction, that is infinite. Let S be the schedule associated with . By construction, in S every correct process takes an infinite number of steps and every message sent to a correct process is eventually received. By Lemma 6.2.2, there is a T such that R ϭ ͗F, H Ᏸ , I i , S, T͘ is a run of Consensus Ᏸ . By construction, all vertices in are bivalent. By Lemma 6.3.5, no correct process decides in R, thus violating the termination requirement of Consensus-a contradiction. e Let S be the last vertex of (clearly, S is bivalent). Let p be the next correct process in round-robin order when the loop in Figure 4 ( (
Without loss of generality, assume that all correct processes decided 0 in S ⅐ E(I i ). Refer to Figure 6 . Since all steps in the path from S to S 1 are steps of p, the state of every process other than p is the same in S(I i ) and in S 1 (I i ). Furthermore, any message addressed to a process other than p that is in the message buffer in S(I i ) is still in the message buffer in S 1 (I i ). Since E is applicable to S(I i ) and does not contain any steps of p, an easy induction on the number of steps in E shows that: (a) E is also applicable to S 1 (I i ), and (b) the state of every process other than p is the same in S ⅐ E(I i ) and S 1 ⅐ E(I i ). By (ii), (a) implies that S 1 ⅐ E is a vertex in ⌼ i . By (b), all correct processes decide 0 in S 1 ⅐ E(I i ). So S 1 , has tag 0. But S 1 is 1-valent-a contradiction. e LEMMA 6.5.3. The deciding process of a decision gadget is correct.
PROOF. Let ␥ be any decision gadget of ⌼ i . There are two cases to consider:
(1) ␥ is a fork. By Lemma 6.5.2, the deciding process of ␥ is correct.
(2) ␥ is a hook. Assume (without loss of generality) that S is the pivot of ␥, S 0 ϭ S ⅐ ( pЈ, mЈ, dЈ) is the 0-valent leaf of ␥ and
is the 1-valent leaf of ␥ (see Figure 7 ). There are two cases:
(a) p ϭ pЈ. By Lemma 6.5.2, p is correct. (b) p pЈ. Suppose, for contradiction, that p crashes. By Lemma 6.2.6, there is a schedule E containing only steps of correct processes (and hence no step of p) such that: (i) S 0 ⅐ E is a vertex of ⌼ i and all correct processes have decided in S 0 ⅐ E(I i ). Since S 0 is 0-valent, all correct processes must have decided 0 in S 0 ⅐ E(I i ).
(ii) If E is applicable to S 1 (I i ), then S 1 ⅐ E is a vertex of ⌼ i . 
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Let SЈ ϭ S ⅐ ( p, m, d) be the parent of S 1 . The state of every process other than p is the same in S(I i ) and SЈ(I i ). Furthermore, any message addressed to a process other than p that is in the message buffer in S(I i ) is still in the message buffer in SЈ(I i ). Therefore, since S 0 ϭ S ⅐ ( pЈ, mЈ, dЈ) and S 1 ϭ SЈ ⅐ ( pЈ, mЈ, dЈ), the state of every process other than p is the same in S 0 (I i ) and S 1 (I i ). In addition, any message addressed to a process other than p that is in the message buffer in S 0 (I i ) is also in the message buffer in S 1 (I i ). Since E is applicable to S 0 (I i ) and does not contain any steps of p, an easy induction on the number of steps in E shows that: (a) E is also applicable to S 1 (I i ), and (b) the state of every process other than p is the same in S 0 ⅐ E(I i ) and S 1 ⅐ E(I i ). By (ii), (a) implies that S 1 ⅐ E is a vertex of ⌼ i . By (b), all correct processes decide 0 in S 1 ⅐ E(I i ). Thus, S 1 , receives a tag of 0. But S 1 is 1-valent-a contradiction. e There may be several critical indices and several decision gadgets in the simulation forest. Thus, Lemmata 6.5.1 and 6.5.3 may identify many correct processes. Our selection rule will choose one of these, as the failure detector ⍀ requires, as follows. It first determines the smallest critical index i. If i is monovalent critical, it selects p i . If, on the other hand, i is bivalent critical, it chooses the "smallest" decision gadget in ⌼ i according to some encoding of gadgets, and selects the corresponding deciding process. It is easy to encode finite graphs as natural numbers. Since a decision gadget is just a finite graph, the selection rule can use any such encoding. The whole method of selecting a correct process is shown in Figure 8 (recall that G is any directed acyclic graph that satisfies Properties 1-4 of Section 6.2 with respect to the given failure pattern F). PROOF. By Lemma 6.3.7, there is a critical index i, 0 Ͻ i Յ n. If i is monovalent critical, Line (2) returns p i which, by Lemma 6.5.1, is correct. If i is bivalent critical, by Lemma 6.4.1, ⌼ i contains at least one decision gadget. Let ␥ be the decision gadget in ⌼ i with the smallest encoding. By Lemma 6.5.3, the deciding process of ␥ is correct in F. Thus, Line (3) returns the identity of a process that is correct. e 6.6. THE REDUCTION ALGORITHM T Ᏸ3⍀ . The selection of a correct process described in Figure 8 is not yet the distributed algorithm T Ᏸ3⍀ that we are seeking: it involves an infinite simulation forest and is "centralized". To turn it into a distributed algorithm, we will modify it as follows: Each process will cooperate with other processes to construct ever increasing finite approximations of the same simulation forest. Such approximations will eventually contain the decision gadget and the other tagging information necessary to extract the identity of the same correct process chosen by the selection method in Figure 8 .
Note that the selection method in Figure 8 involves three stages: The construction of G, a DAG representing samples of failure detector values and some of their temporal relationship; the construction and tagging of the simulation forest induced by G; and, finally, the selection of a correct process using this forest.
Algorithm T Ᏸ3⍀ consists of two components. In the first component, each process repeatedly queries its failure detector module and sends the failure detector values it sees to the other processes. This component enables correct processes to construct ever increasing finite approximations of the same DAG G. Since all inter-process communication occurs in this component, we call it the communication component of T Ᏸ3⍀ .
In the second component, each process repeatedly (a) constructs and tags the simulation forest induced by its current approximation of graph G, and (b) selects the identity of a process using its current simulation forest. Since this component does not require any communication, we call it the computation component of T Ᏸ3⍀ . 6.6.1. THE COMMUNICATION COMPONENT. In this component, processes cooperate to construct ever increasing approximations of the same graph G. The communication component of T Ᏸ3⍀ for p, shown in Figure 9 , works as follows: Let G p denote p's current approximation of G. Every process p repeatedly performs the following three tasks. (i) If p receives G q for some q, it incorporates this information by replacing G p with the union of G p and G q . (ii) Process p queries its own failure detector module. If this is the kth query of p to its failure detector module, and d is the value p sees in this query, then p adds [ p, d, k] to G p . Let [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] be any vertex that was in G p just before this insertion. Clearly, p saw d in its kth query after pЈ saw dЈ in its kЈth query. Thus, p adds an edge from every such [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] in G p to [ p, d, k] . (iii) Process p sends its updated G p to all processes.
Note that the body of the repeat forever loop in Figure 9 corresponds to a single step of p's algorithm, and that each step is subdivided in three phases: receive, failure detector query, and send. This conforms to our model, as defined in Section 2. Recall that in this model the three phases of a step occur atomically at some discrete time t. If p takes a step at time t, we denote by G p (t) the value of G p at the end of that step.
To show that the local graphs constructed by the communication component are ever increasing finite approximations of the same infinite limit graph, we first prove: LEMMA 6.6.1.1. For any correct process p and any time t:
) is a subgraph of G p (tЈ), for all tЈ Ն t. (2) For every correct process q, there is a time tЈ Ն t such that G p (t) is a subgraph of G q (tЈ).
PROOF. The first part of the lemma follows from the fact that no vertex or edge of G p is ever removed. Since p is correct, at some time tЈ Ն t it sends its local graph G p (tЈ) to all processes, including q. Since q is correct, it eventually receives G p (tЈ), and then replaces G q with G q ഫ G p (tЈ), say at time tЉ. By the first part of the lemma, G p (t) is a subgraph of G p (tЈ). Thus, G p (t) is a subgraph of G q (tЉ). e Lemma 6.6.1.1(1) allows us to define G p ϱ ϭ ഫ tʦ-G p (t).
LEMMA 6.6.1.
For any correct processes p and q, G p
PROOF. Let o be any vertex or edge of G p ϱ , that is, there is a time t at which o is in G p (t). From Lemma 6.6.1.1(2), there is a time tЈ such that
Lemma 6.6.1.2 allows us to define the limit graph G to be G p ϱ for any correct process p. We will show (Corollary 6.6.1.5) that G is an infinite DAG that has the four properties defined in Section 6.2. To do so, we first prove a technical lemma.
Let v ϭ [ p, d, k] be a vertex of a local graph during the execution of the communication component, and t be the earliest time when v appears in any local graph.
1) The first graph that contains v is G p (t) (i.e., v is in G p (t), but not in G q (tЈ), for any process q and any time tЈ Ͻ t). Moreover, at time t, p sees d, k is the value of k p , and p inserts v in G p . (2) If edge u 3 v is in some local graph during the execution of the communication component, then u 3 v is also in G p (t). (3) Any local graph that contains v also contains G p (t).
PROOF
(1) Let q be the process that inserts v in its local graph G q at time t. This insertion occurs in Line (1) or (2) Recall that we are considering a fixed run of T Ᏸ3⍀ , with failure pattern F, and failure detector history H Ᏸ ʦ Ᏸ(F). We now prove that the local graphs constructed by the communication component of T Ᏸ3⍀ satisfy four properties that are very similar to those of the DAGs defined in Section 6.2. To state these properties, we define the label of a vertex v of a local graph to be the earliest time when v appears in any local graph. LEMMA 6.6.1.4. For any correct process p and any time t:
(1) The vertices of G p (t) are of the form [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] where pЈ ʦ ⌸, dЈ ʦ Ᏸ and kЈ ʦ N. [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] and [ pЈ, dЉ, kЉ] of G p (t), such that kЈ Ͻ kЉ. Let the labels of these vertices be tЈ and tЉ, respectively. By Lemma 6.6.1.3(1), the first graphs that contain these vertices are G pЈ (tЈ) and G pЈ (tЉ), respectively. Furthermore, the values of k pЈ at times tЈ and tЉ are kЈ and kЉ, respectively. Since the value of k pЈ never decreases, and kЈ Ͻ kЉ, it follows that tЈ Ͻ tЉ. By Lemma 6.6.1.1(1), G pЈ (tЈ) is a subgraph of G pЈ (tЉ). Thus, when pЈ inserts [ pЈ, dЉ, kЉ] in G pЈ at time tЉ, G pЈ already contains [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] . In Line (2) of the algorithm, pЈ adds the edge [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] 3 [ pЈ, dЉ, kЉ] to G pЈ (tЉ). By Lemma 6.6.1.3(3), since G p (t) contains [ pЈ, dЉ, kЉ] , it also contains G pЈ (tЉ). Thus, G p (t) contains the edge [ pЈ, dЈ, kЈ] 3 [ pЈ, dЉ, kЉ] .
is an edge in G p (t), it is also an edge in G q i (t i ). By Lemma 6.6.1.3(3), since
Property 4. Since p is correct, it takes a step at some time tЈ after t. In the failure detector query phase of this step, p queries its failure detector module and obtains a value, say d ʦ Ᏸ . In Line (2) of this step, p inserts vertex [ p, d, k] in G p (where k is the current value of k p ) and an edge from all other vertices of G p (tЈ) to [ p, d, k] . By Lemma 6.6.1.1(1), G p (t) is a subgraph of G p (tЈ); hence, the result follows. e Lemma 6.6.1.4 and the definition of the limit graph G immediately imply: COROLLARY 6.6.1.5. The limit graph G satisfies the four properties of the DAGs defined in Section 6.2.
As before ⌼ i denotes the tagged simulation tree induced by the limit graph G and initial configuration I i , and ⌼ denotes the tagged simulation forest {⌼ 0 , ⌼ 1 , . . . , ⌼ n }.
6.6.2. THE COMPUTATION COMPONENT. Since the limit graph G has the four properties of Section 6.2, (Corollary 6.6.5), we can apply the "centralized" selection method of Figure 8 to identify a correct process. This method involved: -Constructing and tagging the infinite simulation forest ⌼ induced by G.
-Applying a rule to ⌼ to select a particular correct process p*.
In the computation component of T Ᏸ3⍀ , each process p approximates the above method by repeatedly: -Constructing and tagging the finite simulation forest ⌼ p induced by G p , its present finite approximation of G.
-Applying the same rule to ⌼ p to select a particular process.
Since the limit of ⌼ p over time is ⌼, and the information necessary to select p* is in a finite subgraph of ⌼, we can show that eventually p will keep selecting the correct process p*, forever. Actually, p cannot quite use the tagging method of Figure 8 : that method requires knowing which processes are correct! Instead, p assigns tag k to a vertex S in ⌼ p i if and only if S has a descendent SЈ such that p itself has decided k in SЈ(I i ). If p is correct, this is eventually equivalent to the tagging method of Figure 8 . If p crashes, we do not care how it tags its forest. Also, p cannot use exactly the same selection method as that of Figure 8 : its current simulation forest ⌼ p may not yet have a critical index or contain any decision gadget (although it eventually will!). In that case, p temporizes by just selecting itself. The computation component of T Ᏸ3⍀ is shown in Figure 10 (compare it with the selection method of Figure 8 ).
We first show that ⌼ p , the simulation forest that p constructs, is indeed an increasingly accurate approximation of ⌼ (Lemma 6.6.2.1). We then show that the tags that p gives to any vertex S in ⌼ p are eventually the same ones that the tagging rule of Figure 8 gives to S in ⌼ (Lemma 6.6.2.2). Let ⌼ p (t) denote ⌼ p at time t, that is, ⌼ p (t) is the finite simulation forest induced by G p (t). 
Property (1). Let S be any vertex of tree ⌼ p i (t) (for some i, 0 Յ i Յ n). From the definition of ⌼ p i (t), S is compatible with some path of g of G p (t) and applicable to I i . Since G p (t) is a subgraph of G, g is also a path of G. Thus, S is compatible with G; since it is also applicable to I i , it is a vertex of ⌼ i . Similarly, let S 3 SЈ be an edge e of ⌼ p i (t). Since S and SЈ are also vertices of ⌼ i , and SЈ ϭ S ⅐ e, S 3 SЈ is also an edge of ⌼ i .
Property (2). Follows from Lemma 6.6.1.1(1).
Property (3). We first show that ⌼ is a subgraph of ഫ tʦ-⌼ p (t). Let S be any vertex of any tree ⌼ i of ⌼. From the definition of ⌼ i , S is compatible with some finite path g of G and is applicable to I i . Since G ϭ ഫ tʦ-G p (t) and g is a finite path of G, there is a time t such that g is also a path of G p (t). Since S is compatible with g of G p (t) and is applicable to I i , S is a vertex of ⌼ p i (t). Let S 3 SЈ be any edge e of ⌼ i . By the argument above, there is a time t after which both S and SЈ are vertices of ⌼ p i . Since SЈ ϭ S ⅐ e, after time t the edge e is also in ⌼ p i . Thus, every vertex and every edge of ⌼ is also in PROOF. Suppose that at some time t, p assigns tag k to vertex S of tree ⌼ p i . Thus, S has a descendent SЈ in ⌼ p i (t) such that p has decided k in SЈ(I i ). By Lemma 6.6.2.1(1), SЈ is also a descendent of S in ⌼ i , and since p is correct, S has tag k in ⌼ i as well. Conversely, suppose a vertex S of a tree ⌼ i of ⌼ has tag k. We show that, eventually, p also assigns tag k to S in ⌼ p i . Since S has tag k in ⌼ i , S has a descendent SЈ in ⌼ i such that some correct process has decided k in SЈ(I i ) (cf. tagging rule in Figure 8 ). By Lemma 6.2.6(1), there is a descendent SЉ of SЈ in ⌼ i , such that all correct processes, including p, have decided in SЉ(I i ). By Lemma 6.2.1, SЉ(I i ) is a configuration of a partial run of Consensus Ᏸ . By the Agreement property of Consensus, p must have decided k in SЉ(I i ). Consider the path that starts from the root of ⌼ i and goes to vertex S and then to SЉ. By Lemma 6.6.2.1(3), there is a time t after which this path is also in ⌼ p i . Therefore, when p executes the tagging rule of Figure 10 after time t, p assigns tag k to S in
Recall that p* is the correct process obtained by applying the selection rule of Figure 8 to the infinite simulation forest ⌼. We now show that there is a time after which any correct p always selects p* when it applies the corresponding selection rule of Figure 10 to its own finite approximation of the simulation forest ⌼ p . Roughly speaking, the reason is as follows: By Lemma 6.6.2.2, there is a time t after which the tags of all the roots in p's forest ⌼ p are the same as in the infinite forest ⌼. Since these tags determine the sets of monovalent and bivalent critical indices, after time t these sets according to p are the same as in ⌼. Let i be the minimum critical index in these sets, and consider the situation after time t. If i is monovalent critical, the selection rule of Figure 10 selects p i , which is what p* is in this case. If i is bivalent critical, then p selects the deciding process of its current minimum decision gadget of ⌼ p i (if it has one). This case is examined below.
Let ␥* be the minimum decision gadget of ⌼ i (so, p* is the deciding process of ␥*). For a while, ␥* may not be the minimum decision gadget of ⌼ p i . This may be because ␥* (and its tags) is not yet in ⌼ p i . However, by Lemmata 6.6.2.1(3) and 6.6.2.2, ␥* (including its tags) will eventually be in ⌼ p i . Alternatively, it may be because ⌼ p i contains a subgraph ␥ whose encoding is smaller than ␥*'s, and for a while ␥ looks like a decision gadget according to its present tags. However, by Lemma 6.6.2.2, p will eventually determine all the tags of ␥, and discover that ␥ is not really a decision gadget. Since there are only finitely many graphs whose encoding is smaller than ␥*'s, p will eventually discard all the "fake" decision gadgets (like ␥) that are smaller than ␥*, and then select ␥* as its minimum decision gadget. After that time, p always selects the deciding process of ␥*-which is precisely p*, in this case. THEOREM 6.6.2.3. For all correct processes p, there is a time after which output p ϭ p*, forever.
PROOF. Let i* denote the critical index selected by Line (1) of Figure 8 applied to ⌼. By Lemma 6.6.2.2, there is a time t init after which every root of ⌼ p has the same tags as the corresponding root of ⌼. Thus, after time t init , p always sets i ϭ i* in Line (1) of Figure 10 . We now show that there is a time after which the computation component of p (Figure 10 ) always returns p*. There are two cases:
(1) i* is monovalent critical. In this case, p* is process p i* (by Line (2) of the selection rule Figure 8 ). Similarly, after time t init : (a) p always sets i to i* (Line (1) of Figure 10 ); (b) p always returns p i* (Line (2) of Figure 10 ). (2) i* is bivalent critical. Let ␥* denote the smallest decision gadget of ⌼ i* . In this case, p* is the deciding process of ␥*. Since ␥* is a finite subgraph of ⌼ i* , by Lemma 6.6.2.1(3), there is a time after which ␥* is also a subgraph of ⌼ p i . By Lemma 6.6.2.2, there is a time t ␥* after which all the (finitely many) vertices of ␥* receive the same tags in ⌼ i* and ⌼ p i* . Thus, after time t ␥* , ␥* is also a decision gadget of ⌼ p i* .
Since each graph is encoded as a unique natural number, there are finitely many graphs with a smaller encoding than ␥*. Let Ᏻ denote the set of graphs with a smaller encoding than ␥*, and ␥ be any graph in Ᏻ. We show that there is a time after which ␥ is not a decision gadget of ⌼ p i* . There are two cases:
(a) ␥ is not a subgraph of ⌼ i* . In this case, by Lemma 6.6.2.1(1), ␥ is never a subgraph of ⌼ p i* .
(b) ␥ is a subgraph of ⌼ i* . Since ␥* is the smallest decision gadget of ⌼ i* and ␥ is smaller than ␥*, ␥ is not a decision gadget of ⌼ i* . By Lemma 6.6.2.2, there is a time t ␥ after which all the (finitely many) vertices of ␥ have the same tags in ⌼ i* and ⌼ p i* . Thus, after time t ␥ , ␥ is not a decision gadget of ⌼ p i .
Since Ᏻ is finite, there is a time t Ᏻ after which no graph in Ᏻ is a decision gadget of ⌼ p i .
Consider the process that is returned by the computation component of p (Figure 10 ) at any time t Ͼ max(t init , t ␥* , t Ᏻ ). Since t Ͼ t init , p always sets i to i* in Line (1). Since t Ͼ t ␥* , ␥* is a decision gadget of ⌼ p i (t). Finally, since t Ͼ t Ᏻ , ␥* is the smallest decision gadget of ⌼ p i (t). Thus, since i* is bivalent, at any time after max(t init , t ␥* , t Ᏻ ), Line (3) of Figure 10 returns the deciding process of ␥*. Therefore, after time max(t init , t ␥* , t Ᏻ ), the computation component of p always returns p*.
From the above, there is a time after which p sets output p 4 p*, forever, in Line (3) PROOF. Consider the execution of algorithm T Ᏸ3⍀ in any environment Ᏹ. By Theorem 6.6.2.3, there is a time after which all correct processes set output p ϭ p*, forever. By Theorem 6.5.4, p* is a correct process. Thus, T Ᏸ3⍀ is a reduction algorithm that transforms Ᏸ into ⍀. In other words, ⍀ is reducible to Ᏸ. e 7. Discussion 7.1. GRANULARITY OF ATOMIC ACTIONS. Our model incorporates very strong assumptions about the atomicity of steps. First, the three phases of each step are assumed to occur indivisibly, and at a single time. In particular, the failure of a process cannot happen in the "middle of a step". This allows us to associate a single time t with a step and think of the step as occurring at that time. Second, in the send phase of a step, a message is sent to all processes. Given that the entire step is indivisible, this means that either all or none of the correct processes eventually receive the message sent in a step. Finally, no two steps can occur at the same time.
13 These assumptions are convenient because they make the formal model simpler to describe. Also, they are consistent with those made in the model of Fischer et al. [1985] , that provided the impetus for this work.
On the other hand, in Chandra and Toueg [1996] , a model with weaker properties is used. There, the three phases of a step need not occur indivisibly, and may occur at different times. Even within the send phase, the messages sent to the different processes may be sent at different times. Thus, a failure may occur in the middle of the send phase, resulting in some correct processes eventually receiving the messages sent to them in that step while others never do. Also, actions of different processes may take place simultaneously, subject to the restriction that a message can only be received strictly after it was sent. Since Chandra and Toueg [1996] is mainly concerned with showing how to use various types of failure detectors to achieve Consensus, the use of a weaker model strengthens the results. (In fact, the negative results of Chandra and Toueg [1996] hold even in the model of this paper, with the stronger atomicity assumptions.)
The question naturally arises whether our result also applies to this weaker model. In other words, if a failure detector Ᏸ can be used to solve Consensus in the weak model, is it true that we can transform Ᏸ to ᐃ in that model? It turns out that the answer is affirmative. To see this, first note that if Ᏸ solves Consensus in the weak model, then it surely solves Consensus in the strong model. By our result, Ᏸ can be transformed to ᐃ in the strong model. It remains to show that Ᏸ can be transformed to ᐃ in the weak model. This is not obvious, since it is conceivable that the extra properties of the strong model are crucial in the transformation of Ᏸ to ᐃ. Fortunately, the transformation presented in this paper actually works even in the weak model! To see this, it is sufficient to ensure that the communication component of the transformation (cf. Figure 9 in Section 6.6.1) constructs graphs that satisfy the properties listed in Lemma 6.6.1.4, even if we run it in the weak model. It is not difficult to verify that this is indeed so. The proof is virtually the same, except for the fact that we must distinguish the time t in which a process p queries its failure detector and the time tЈ in which p adds the value it saw into G p . In our proof, we assume that t ϭ tЈ; in the weak model, we would have t Յ tЈ. Similar comments apply to all actions within a step that are no longer assumed to occur at the same instant of time. These changes make the proofs slightly more cumbersome, since we must introduce notation for all the different times in which relevant actions within a step take place, but the reasoning remains essentially the same. 14 Thus, our result is not merely a fortuitous consequence of some whimsical choice of model. We view the robustness of the result across different models of asynchrony as further testimony to the significance of the failure detector ᐃ.
7.2. FAILURE DETECTION AND PARTIAL SYNCHRONY. Intuitively, the reason why Consensus cannot be solved in completely asynchronous systems is the fact that, in such systems, it is impossible to reliably distinguish a process that has crashed from one that is merely very slow. In other words, Consensus is unsolvable because accurate failure detection is impossible. On the other hand, it is well known that Consensus is solvable (deterministically) in completely synchronous systems-that is, systems where all processes take steps at the same rate and each message arrives at its destination a fixed and known amount of time after it is sent. In such a system we can use timeouts to implement a "perfect" failure detector-that is, one in which no process is ever wrongly suspected, and every faulty process is eventually suspected. Thus, the ability to solve Consensus in a given system is intimately related to the failure detection 14 Another problem that must be confronted is that in the proofs of Lemmata 6.6.1.3 and 6.6.1.4 we often refer to the "first graph" in which a vertex or edge is present. In the strong model, there is no difficulty with this, since processes cannot execute steps simultaneously. In the weak model, we have to justify that it makes sense to speak of the "first" graph to contain a vertex or edge, in spite of the fact that certain actions can be executed at the same time. The fact that a message can be received only after it was sent is needed here. capabilities of that system. This realization led to the extension of the asynchronous model of computation with failure detectors in Chandra and Toueg [1996] . In that paper, Consensus is shown to be solvable even with very weak failure detectors that could make an infinite number of "mistakes".
A different tack on circumventing the unsolvability of Consensus is pursued in Dolev et al. [1987] and Dwork et al. [1988] . The approach of those papers is based on the observation that between the completely synchronous and completely asynchronous models of distributed systems there lie a variety of intermediate "partially synchronous" models. For instance, in one model of partial synchrony, processes take steps at the same rate, but message delays are unbounded (albeit finite). Alternatively, it may be known that message delays are bounded, but the actual bound may be unknown. In yet another variation, the eventual maximum message delay is known, but during some initial period of finite but unknown duration some messages may experience longer delays. These and many other models of partial synchrony are studied in Dolev et al. [1987] and Dwork et al. [1988] , and the question of solvability of Consensus in each of them is answered either positively or negatively.
In particular, Dolev et al. [1987] defines a space of 32 models by considering five key parameters, each of which admits a "favorable" and an "unfavorable" setting. For instance, one of the parameters is whether the maximum message delay is known (favorable setting) or not (unfavorable setting). Each of the 32 models corresponds to a particular setting of the 5 parameters. Dolev et al. [1987] identifies four "minimal" models in which Consensus is solvable. These are minimal in the sense that the weakening of any parameter from favorable to unfavorable would yield a model of partial synchrony where Consensus is unsolvable. Thus, within the space of the models considered, Dolev et al. [1987] and Dwork et al. [1988] delineate precisely the boundary between solvability and unsolvability of Consensus, and provide an answer to the question "What is the least amount of synchrony sufficient to solve Consensus?".
Failure detectors can be viewed as a more abstract and modular way of incorporating partial synchrony assumptions into the model of computation. Instead of focusing on the operational features of partial synchrony (such as the five parameters considered in Dolev et al. [1987] ), we can consider the axiomatic properties that failure detectors must have in order to solve Consensus. The problem of implementing a given failure detector in a specific model of partial synchrony becomes a separate issue; this separation affords greater modularity.
To see the connection between partial synchrony and failure detectors, it is useful to examine how one might go about implementing a failure detector. By the impossibility result of Fischer et al. [1985] , a failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus cannot be implemented in a completely asynchronous system. Now consider partially synchronous systems in which correct processes have accurate timers (i.e., they can measure elapsed time). If, in such a system, message delays are bounded and the maximum delay is known, we can use timeouts to implement the "perfect" failure detector described above. In a weaker system where message delays are bounded but the maximum delay is not known, we can implement a failure detector satisfying a weaker property: eventually no correct process is suspected. This can be done by using timeouts of increasing length; once the timeout period has been increased sufficiently to exceed the unknown maximum delay, no correct process will be suspected. A failure detector with the same property can also be implemented in a distributed system where the eventual maximum message delay is known, but messages may be delayed for longer during some initial period of finite but unknown duration. With these remarks, we illustrate two points: First, that stronger failure detectors correspond to stronger models of partial synchrony; and second, that the same failure detector can be implemented in different models of partial synchrony.
Studying failure detectors rather than various models of partial synchrony has several advantages. By determining whether Consensus is solvable using some specific failure detector, we thereby determine whether Consensus is solvable in all systems in which that failure detector can be implemented. An algorithm that relies on the axiomatic properties of a given failure detector is more general, more modular, and simpler to understand than one that relies directly on some specific operational features of partial synchrony (that can be used to implement the given failure detector).
From this more abstract point of view, the question "What is the least amount of synchrony sufficient to solve Consensus?" translates to "What is the weakest failure detector sufficient to solve Consensus?". In contrast to Dolev et al. [1987] , which identified a set of minimal models of partial synchrony in which Consensus is solvable, we are able to exhibit a single minimum failure detector that can be used to solve Consensus. The technical device that made this possible is the notion of reduction between failure detectors. We suspect that a corresponding notion of reduction between models of partial synchrony, although possible, would be more complex. This is because there are models which are not comparable in general (in the sense that there are tasks that are possible in one but not in the other and vice versa), although they are comparable as far as failure detection is concerned-which is all that matters for solving Consensus! In this connection, it is useful to recall our earlier observation, that the same failure detector can be implemented in different (indeed, incomparable) models of partial synchrony.
7.3. WEAK CONSENSUS. Fischer et al. [1988] actually showed that even the Weak Consensus problem cannot be solved (deterministically) in an asynchronous system. Weak Consensus is like Consensus except that the validity property is replaced by the following, weaker, property:
Nontriviality. There is a run of the protocol in which correct processes decide 0, and a run in which correct processes decide 1.
Unlike validity, this property does not explicitly prescribe conditions under which the correct processes must decide 0 or 1-it merely states that it is possible for them to reach each of these decisions. It is natural to ask whether our result holds for this weaker problem as well. That is, we would like to know if the following holds: THEOREM 7.3.1. For all environments Ᏹ, if a failure detector Ᏸ can be used to solve Weak Consensus in Ᏹ, then Ᏸ ՝ ϪᏱ ⍀.
Under the above definition of nontriviality, this is not quite right. But as we shall argue, the problem really lies with the definition! Under a slightly stronger definition, which is more appropriate for our model that incorporates failure detectors, the theorem is actually true.
Intuitively, the problem with the above definition of nontriviality in our model of failure detectors is that it is possible for the decision of correct processes to depend entirely on the values returned by the failure detector. Consider, for example, a failure detector Ᏸ so that for each failure pattern F, Ᏸ(F) ϭ {H 0 , H 1 }, where for all processes p and times t, and for all i ʦ {0, 1}, H i ( p, t) ϭ i. In other words, in any given run, this failure detector returns the same binary value to all processes at all times, independent of the run's failure pattern. It is trivial to use this failure detector to solve Weak Consensus: A process merely queries its failure detector and decides the value returned! It is easy to see that Ᏸ ՝ Ϫ ͞ Ᏹ ⍀, for any nontrivial environment Ᏹ: Ᏸ provides absolutely no information about which processes are correct or faulty.
15
At this point, the reader may justifiably object that Ᏸ is "cheating"-it is really not a failure detector, but a mechanism that nondeterministically chooses the decision value. One possible way of fixing this problem would be to make our definition of failure detector less general than it presently is. We could then try to prove the theorem for this restricted definition of failure detectors. This approach, however, is fraught with the danger of restricting the definition too much and ruling out legitimate failure detectors in addition to bogus ones, like Ᏸ. Intuitively, the failure detector is supposed to provide some information about faulty processes. Since this information may be encoded in a complex way, we should not arbitrarily rule out such encodings because, in doing so, we may be inadvertently ruling out useful failure detectors.
Instead of modifying our definition of a failure detector, we strengthen the nontriviality property to require that the failure detector values seen by the processes do not, by themselves, determine the decision value. To formalize this, let R be a run of a Consensus algorithm, and ( p 1 , m 1 , d 1 ), ( p 2 , m 2 , d 2 ), . . . , be the schedule of R. We denote by fd(R) the sequence [ p 1 , d 1 ], [ p 2 , d 2 ], . . . , that is, the sequence of failure detector values seen by the processes in R. Consider the relation ϵ on runs, where R ϵ RЈ if and only if fd(R) ϭ fd(RЈ). It is immediate that ϵ is an equivalence relation. We now redefine the nontriviality property in our model (where processes have access to failure detectors) as follows:
Nontriviality. In every equivalence class of the relation ϵ, there is a run of the protocol in which correct processes decide 0, and a run in which correct processes decide 1.
This captures the idea that the decision value cannot be ascertained merely on the basis of the failure detector values seen by the processes. It must also depend on other aspects of the run (such as the initial values, the particular messages sent, or other features).
If we define Weak Consensus using this version of nontriviality, then Theorem 7.3.1 is, in fact, true. We briefly sketch the modifications of our proof needed to obtain this strengthening of Theorem 5.2. The only use of the validity property is in the proof of Lemma 6.3.6, which states that the root of ⌼ 0 is 0-valent and the root of ⌼ n is 1-valent. This, in turn, is used in the proof of Lemma 6.3.7, which states that a critical index exists.
To prove the stronger theorem, we concentrate on the forest induced by all initial configurations-not just I 0 , . . . , I n . Thus, the forest now will have 2 n trees, rather than only n ϩ 1. Consider the n initial values of processes in an initial configuration as an n-bit vector, and fix any n-bit Gray code. 16 Let I 0 , . . . , I 2 n Ϫ1 be the initial configurations listed in the order specified by the Gray code, and ⌼ i be the tree ⌼ G I i , for all i ʦ {0, . . . , 2 n Ϫ 1}. We use the same definition for a critical index as we had before: Index i ʦ {0, . . . , 2 n Ϫ 1} is critical if the root of ⌼ i is bivalent or the root of ⌼ i is 1-valent while the root of ⌼ iϪ1 is 0-valent. The only difference is that we now take subtraction to be modulo 2 n , so that when i ϭ 0, i Ϫ 1 ϭ Ϫ1 ϭ 2 n Ϫ 1. We can now prove an analogue to Lemma 6.3.7. LEMMA 7.3.2. There is a critical index i, 0 Յ i Յ 2 n Ϫ 1.
PROOF. First, we claim that the forest contains both nodes tagged 0 and nodes tagged 1. To see this, let S be a node in some tree of the forest. By Lemma 6.3.1, S has a tag; without loss of generality, assume that S has tag 0. Consider an infinite path that extends S. By Lemma 6.2.2, and the fact that S is tagged 0, there is a run R of the Weak Consensus algorithm in which a correct process decides 0. By nontriviality, there is a run RЈ ϵ R, so that correct processes decide 1 in RЈ. Let SЈ be the infinite schedule and I ᐉ be the initial configuration of run RЈ. Using the definition of the ϵ relation and the construction of the induced forest, it is easy to show that every finite prefix of SЈ is a node of ⌼ ᐉ . Since correct processes decide 1 in RЈ, all these nodes are tagged 1.
Since there are both nodes tagged 0 and nodes tagged 1, by Lemma 6.3.3, there are both roots tagged 0 and roots tagged 1. If the root of some ⌼ i is tagged both 0 and 1, it is bivalent and we are done. Otherwise, the roots of all trees are monovalent, and there are both 0-and 1-valent roots. Thus, there exist 0 Յ i, j Յ 2 n Ϫ 1 so that the root of ⌼ i is 0-valent and the root of ⌼ j is 1-valent. By considering the sequence ⌼ i , ⌼ iϩ1 , . . . , ⌼ j , (where addition is modulo 2 n ) it is easy to see that the root of some ⌼ k , k i, that appears in that sequence is 1-valent, while the root of ⌼ kϪ1 is 0-valent. By definition, k is a critical index. e
The rest of the proof remains unchanged. Chandra and Toueg [1996] only output lists of processes suspected to have crashed. Since the set of processes is finite, the range of possible output values of these failure detectors is also finite. In this paper our model allows for failure detectors with arbitrary ranges of output values, including the possibility of infinite ranges! We illustrate the significance of this generality by describing a natural class of failure detectors whose range of output values is infinite (though each value output is finite).
FAILURE DETECTORS WITH INFINITE RANGE OF OUTPUT VALUES. The failure detectors in
Example. One apparent weakness with our formulation of failure detection is that a brief change in the value output by a failure detector module may go unnoticed. For example, process p's module of the given failure detector, Ᏸ, may output d 1 at time t 1 , d 2 at a later time t 2 , and d 1 again at time t 3 after t 2 . If, due to the asynchrony of the system, p does not take a step between time t 1 and t 3 , p may never notice that its failure detector module briefly output d 2 . A natural way of overcoming this problem is to replace Ᏸ with failure detector ᏰЈ that has the following property: ᏰЈ maintains the same list of suspects as Ᏸ but when queried, ᏰЈ returns the entire history of its list of suspects up to the present time. In this manner, correct processes are guaranteed to notice every change in ᏰЈ's list of suspects. As the system continues executing, the values output by ᏰЈ grow in size. Thus, ᏰЈ has an infinite range of output values.
However, since Ᏸ is a function of F, the failure pattern encountered, ᏰЈ is also a function of F, and can be described by our model. Thus, the result in this paper applies to ᏰЈ, a natural failure detector with an infinite range of output values.
in G. So, for all j Ͼ 0, S
